Mister Criminology

Republic of the Philippines vs. Clemente Tapay and Alberto T. Barrion, as the legal representative of the heirs of the deceased Floral Tapay,

G.R. No. 157719, March 2, 2022

Facts:

1. Sometime in 1980, Flora and Clemente Tapay filed an application for registration of Lot No. 10786 before the RTC of Lipa City. They alleged that a certain Francisca Cueto had been in possession of the property since 1925 until it was sold to Teofila Lindog, respondents' predecessor. When Teofila died intestate in 1971, respondents inherited the property.

2. Respondents' application for registration was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General.

3. During the course of the proceedings, the Land Registration Commission or LRC (now the Land Registration Authority or LRA) issued a report stating that based on the Books of Cadastral Lots, the lot was previously the subject of registration in another case-Cadastral Case No. 33 and had already been adjudicated to another person, but the cadastral court has yet to issue a decree of registration.

4. The LRC, however, was unable to determine the identity of the person to whom the property was adjudicated to because the records of the case, including a copy of the decision, were not available

5. Despite the report of the LRC, the RTC adjudicated the land to the respondents.

6. After the Decision became final, the RTC directed the LRC to issue the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title. However, instead of complying with the order, the LRC submitted a supplemental report reiterating that the subject land was previously the subject of registration proceedings in Cadastral Case No. 33. The LRC then recommended that the cadastral court's decision be nullified so that it can issue a decree of registration in favor of respondents.

7. Accordingly, respondents filed a motion to set aside the decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 in order to give effect to the Decision of the RTC. This motion was granted by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC can set aside the decision of the cadastral court

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with petitioner that a regional trial court has no power to nullify or interfere with the decision of a co-equal court pursuant to the law and the doctrine of judicial stability. Applying the doctrine to this case, petitioner is correct in postulating that the Order of RTC Lipa City is void and thus, the cadastral court's decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 remains valid and subsisting as of this time.

However, the foregoing presupposes that Cadastral Case No. 33 really existed and that there actually is a decision in that case. Unfortunately for petitioner, aside from the single entry "Cadastral Case No. 33, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1305," no other record, including a copy of the decision, exists to support the theory.

Key information, such as the identity of the parties in the case and of the court that rendered the decision, as well as the outcome thereof, has remained unknown despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the LRC submitted its report. No one, aside from the Republic, has even come forward to claim any interest arising from the supposed case. The Court therefore agrees with the CA that the doctrine of judicial stability finds no application in this case. Practical considerations now demand that the proceedings in the RTC be no longer disturbed and the RTC Order no longer set aside.

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Gorgonio P. Palajos vs. Jose Manolo E. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 7, 2022

Gorgonio P. Palajos vs. Jose Manolo E. Abad,

G.R. No. 205832, March 7, 2022

Facts:

1. Manolo and his siblings, namely, Ma. Jasmin E. Abad and Jose Roman E. Abad, filed a complaint for forcible entry against Palajos, along with other individuals of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. 06-35654.

2. While Civil Case No. 06-35654 was pending, plaintiffs filed a motion to render judgment claiming that defendants therein either filed their answer beyond the reglementary period or did not file any answer at all. The MeTC granted plaintiffs' motion, except against Palajos whose answer was admitted.

3. Plaintiffs claimed that they are the registered owners of three adjacent and contiguous parcels of land which they acquired from their parents in 1999. Sometime in September or October 2001, they took actual possession of the subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it.

4. Plaintiffs claimed that on the third week of January 2006, they discovered that defendants, by means of force upon things, strategy and stealth and without their knowledge and consent, destroyed portions of the perimeter fence, entered the subject property and constructed their houses thereon, depriving plaintiffs of their possession. Upon discovery, plaintiffs made demands for defendants to vacate but the latter failed and refused to remove their houses and structures.

Issues:

· Whether or not issue of ownership can be determined in a forcible entry case

· Whether or not Manolo proved his prior physical possession of the subject property to entitle him to recover in an ejectment suit of forcible entry

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Ruling:

FIRST ISSUE

Yes. As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an issue. As an exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. Thus, based on the foregoing, the issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally determined - to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.

SECOND ISSUE

Yes. The three elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper are the following:

1. plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the defendant encroached on the property;

2. plaintiff was deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth by defendant; and

3. that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his deprivation of the physical possession of the property, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

The Supreme Court consistently held that "possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

This Court finds that it is necessary to provisionally determine ownership of the subject property for purposes of determining prior possession. In the instant case, both the MeTC and the CA correctly found that Manolo and his siblings were able to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject property which they acquired from their parents in 1999. Although they did not immediately put the same to active use, but viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, Manolo had been occupying the land since 1999. On the other hand, Palajos claims that his right to enter Lot No. 5 of the subject property was by virtue of a May 4, 1988 Deed of Absolute Sale which B.C. Regalado & Co. executed in his favor. However, the Court find that Palajos failed to substantially prove the same.

With regard to the issue of prior physical possession, sometime in September or October 2001, Manolo and his siblings took actual possession of the subject property and constructed a concrete perimeter fence around it. On the other hand, Palajos' evidence of alleged prior possession- such as payment of real property taxes on February 17, 2005 and January 21, 2006, or proofs of billing of his Bayantel telephone which he had installed in his residence in the year 2004, or that he was able to procure a COMELEC registration application of his son on October 24, 2003 31 - are incidents that occurred after Manolo took possession of the subject property. Thus, this Court finds that Manolo had prior physical possession of the subject property.

Anent the claim of prescriptive period, the Court find that the same was filed within one year from the time Manolo and his sibling discovered the clandestine entry of the defendants on the third week of January while the complaint was filed on February 23, 2006. Entry in the premises of the subject property without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner, clearly falls under stealth, which is defined as "any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within [the] residence of another without permission.

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Transportation (DOTr) vs. Guillerma Lamaclamac and the Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 240331, March 16, 2022

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Transportation (DOTr) vs. Guillerma Lamaclamac and the Land Registration Authority,

G.R. No. 240331, March 16, 2022

Facts:

1. The subject of the complaint is a parcel of land located at Alubijid, Misamis Oriental, which was brought under cadastral proceedings.

2. On August 26, 1941, the cadastral court issued Decree No. 756523 in favor of Lamaclamac. Thereafter, the LRA recorded Decree No. 756523, in its book. Sadly, Lamaclamac died in 1947. She was survived by her heirs who later on sold the subject lot to the government.

3. On July 7, 2006, the DOTr secured a Certification from the LRA Administrator which states, among others, that Decree No. 756523, is not among those salvaged decrees on file, and thus, is presumed to have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last World War.

4. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOTr, filed Complaint for Cancellation of Decree alleging that Lamaclamac abandoned her right over the subject lot, as borne by the fact that she failed to secure a certificate of title over the same after more than 65 years.

Issues:

· Whether or not the land becomes registered land once the decision of the cadastral court declaring the adjudicatee as owner of the subject lot attains finality.

· Whether or not the failure to secure certificate of title over the subject land after more than 65 years constitute laches or abandonment

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Ruling:

FIRST ISSUE

Yes. The Supreme Court held that once the title of ownership is vested upon the adjudicatee, the land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property, which could not be acquired by adverse possession. Title of ownership is vested once the decision of the cadastral court declaring the adjudicatee as owner of the subject lot attains finality.

In Alberto, the Court stressed that the requirement of registration to bind the land applies only when public land is conveyed through a patent, but "does not apply in cadastral proceedings, wherein the court confirms private ownership of land, which, upon finality, renders the land as registered property." Therefore, the subject lot became a registered property when Decree No. 756523 attained finality.

Once the decree issued to the owner attains finality, the obligation to cause the issuance of the certificate of title devolves upon the government, particularly the Land Registration Authority.

SECOND ISSUE

No. The Supreme Court held that land registration is a special proceeding, that necessarily leads to the declaration of ownership by a person of a parcel of land, in line with the nature of a special proceeding that seeks to establish a status, condition, or fact by judicial fiat. Owing to this peculiarity, once a decision in land registration cases becomes final, it is inevitably "complete in itself and does not need to be filled in," because "the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be enforced against the adverse party." For this reason, the rules on prescription and laches do not apply to land registration cases.

A land becomes registered land once the decision of the cadastral court declaring the adjudicatee as owner of the subject lot attains finality. Once title of ownership is vested in the prevailing party, inaction on his or her part cannot be construed as laches or abandonment, owing to the fact that he or she is not required to undertake any steps to effectuate such decision. From that point on, "a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration."

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Antonio Garcia, Et. Al. vs. Felipe Neri Esclito, Et. Al., G.R. No. 207210, March 21, 2022

Antonio Garcia, Et. Al. vs. Felipe Neri Esclito, Et. Al.,

G.R. No. 207210, March 21, 2022

Facts:

1. Sometime in 1979, petitioner Antonio Garcia purchased from Conchita Matute a 29-hectare parcel of land, through a deed of sale.

2. In 1998, he divided the land and donated portions of it to his children and grandchildren through deeds of transfer of rights.

3. Petitioners then filed with the DENR applications for the issuance of land titles pursuant to the DENR's Handog Titulo program.

4. On November 17-25, 1998, petitioners were issued their respective patents and thereafter certificates of title upon registration.

5. In 2003, respondents, who are holders of certificates of land ownership award (CLOA) issued by the DAR on December 19, 1998, filed a petition for the annulment/declaration of nullity of deed of sale and all the deeds, documents and proceedings relying thereon before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB.

6. Respondents alleged that the 1979 deed of sale was void for violating Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

a. According to respondents, since the 1979 Deed of Sale was not registered before the Registry of Deeds within three months from the effectivity of RA 6657, the sale was void. Consequently, all other deeds, documents, and proceedings relying thereon, including petitioners' certificates of title, are also void.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can validly attack the validity of certificate of title issued in favor of the petitioner by questioning the validity of the Deed of sale which was the basis of the certificate of title

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links:

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that respondents' petition before the Provincial Adjudicator constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on petitioners' Torrens certificates of title.

Section 43 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

A direct attack is an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of a judgment pursuant to which a registration decree is issued, if the judgment has not yet been implemented, or if already implemented, to seek the recovery of the property. On the other hand, a collateral attack transpires when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack is incidentally made against the judgment.

A collateral attack is prohibited because the integrity of land titles and their indefeasibility are guaranteed by the Torrens system of registration. The Torrens system was adopted precisely to quiet titles to lands and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of the titles, except claims which were noted at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. By guaranteeing the integrity of land titles and their indefeasibility, the Torrens system gives the registered owners complete peace of mind.

Here, it is important to note that petitioners are holders of certificates of title registered under the Torrens system. Thus, their certificates can only be attacked directly.

Jurisprudence has recognized an attack on a deed of sale pursuant to which a certificate of title was issued as an impermissible collateral attack on the certificate of title.

You can support our page by clicking any of the following links: