Mister Criminology

Johnny Pagal y La Varias vs. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 251894, March 2, 2022

Facts:

1. On October 14, 2016, Executive Judge Parayno issued Search Warrant No. 33-2016-L. On October 17, 2016, the team implementing the search warrant conducted a briefing at the Lingayen Police Station.

2. Later, the team arrived at Pagal's house. PO3 Naungayan showed him the Search Warrant and explained its contents to him.

3. Upon Kagawad Manuel's arrival, the search of the house commenced.

4. In the living room, PO1 Saringan found atop the television a Marlboro cigarette pack containing four small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substances.

5. As the search was ongoing, Police Officer 1 Oliver Sinaban contacted Emil Toledo of Northwest Sun News and a representative from the Department of Justice. Only Toledo arrived.

6. POl Saringan then marked the items seized in the presence of Pagal, Kagawad Manuel, and Toledo. Still in the presence of the witnesses, POl Saringan proceeded to conduct the inventory. Pagal was then brought to the police station.

Issues:

· Whether or not the search warrant is valid

· Whether or not there is illegal possession of dangerous drugs

· Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

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Ruling:

Petitioner is acquitted.

FIRST ISSUE

Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 33-2016-L because allegedly, there was no evidence that the executive judge who issued the warrant examined the applicant. The Supreme Court is not convinced. Petitioner raised this for the first time before this Court, so he is deemed to have waived his objection when he failed to raise it before the trial court.

SECOND ISSUE

Conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs requires that the following be established: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." Possession contemplates actual and constructive possession

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that all the elements are present. The confiscated drugs were found inside petitioner's house, as specified in the Search Warrant. Absent evidence to the contrary, mere finding of illicit drugs in petitioner's house raises the presumption of constructive possession. Here, apart from alleging non-exclusive possession of the house, Pagal merely denied having smoked Marlboro cigarettes. Pagal also failed to present any authority to possess the illegal drugs confiscated from his house. His only defenses were denial and frame-up. Without clear and persuasive proof, these are inherently weak and deserve no credence.

THIRD ISSUE

Aside from establishing the elements of illegal possession, the prosecution must prove that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti have been preserved and established beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of dangerous drugs as the corpus delicti of the crime is a condition sine qua non for a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165.

Republic Act No. 10640 amended the witness requirement under Section 21, which now only requires an elected public official and either a representative of the National Prosecution Service or of the media. These witnesses must be present not only during inventory, but more important, during the seizure and confiscation of the illegal drugs.

In addition, the prosecution must establish every link in the chain of custody.

Here, the prosecution failed on both counts. Only a general acknowledgement of noncompliance with Section 21 was made, without identifying the specific measures undertaken to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Worse, the prosecution attempted to shift the burden to accused-appellant to allege or prove contamination of the seized illegal drugs.

The two required witnesses were not present during the confiscation of the illegal drugs, tainting both the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs. The Search Warrant was issued on October 14, 2016 but was implemented three days later. Thus, the police officers had sufficient time to ensure that both witnesses would be present during the search. The prosecution did not attempt to explain why the search was commenced without waiting for Toledo. It also appears that Toledo was only contacted while the search was already ongoing. This taints the credibility of the corpus delicti at the time of seizure.

Second, the law and jurisprudence are clear that the marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized drugs "shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served." The prosecution failed to explain why the marking of seized items was done "outside the house."

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In Re: Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Philippine National Bank vs. Alma T. Placencia Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673

In Re: Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, Philippine National Bank vs. Alma T. Placencia Fontanoza,

G.R. No. 213673

Facts:

1. Spouses Salvador and Alma Fontanoza obtained a loan from the Ozamiz Branch of the Philippine National Bank. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land.

2. Since the Fontanozas failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the property.

3. As the sole bidder in the public auction, PNB acquired the lot.

4. PNB registered the sale. However, the Fontanozas failed to redeem the property.

5. More than nine years later, PNB filed an exparte petition for issuance of writ of possession before the RTC.

6. The RTC granted PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

7. More than two months after the RTC's Resolution became final and executory, Alma filed an opposition with urgent motion to recall writ of possession.

8. She averred that she also instituted a suit against PNB before the trial court which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-20-458. Likewise, she had a contract with PNB for the repurchase of the property, and that she had already paid the agreed down payment, which she claimed as earnest money. In addition, she was not notified of PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession

Issue:

Whether or not the Alma can recall the writ of possession.

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Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that "once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at any time. Its right of possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay.

Alma failed to redeem the property during the one-year redemption period. Thus, she ceased to have rights over the subject lot either as a mortgagor or redemptioner.

However, there are exceptions to the rule that the trial court's duty to issue the writ of possession in favor of the purchaser is ministerial. "In Nagtalon v. United Coconut Planters Bank, the Court enumerated the following jurisprudential exceptions:

(a) gross inadequacy of the purchase price;

(b) third party claiming right adverse to the mortgagor/debtor, and;

The first and third exceptions cannot apply to this case since there are no allegations referring to either the purchase price or surplus proceeds of the sale, if any.

A third party should hold possession of the subject property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor. Although Alma is supposedly in possession of the property, she cannot be considered as a third party who held the property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor simply because she herself was the mortgagor who failed to redeem the lot. This is notwithstanding PNB's delay, for reasons only known to it, in filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Alma posits that since she filed a case "for the declaration of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale as null and void or for repurchase," the RTC erroneously issued the writ of possession in PNB's favor. Yet, jurisprudence teaches that "not even any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession." Hence, she cannot insist on the recall of the writ of possession solely because she filed a separate case which questioned the foreclosure and advanced her claim of repurchase.

In the case at bench, the aforementioned exceptions are not present.

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Elizabeth Brual vs. Jorge Brual Contreras, et. Al., G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

Elizabeth Brual vs. Jorge Brual Contreras, et. Al.,

G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

Facts:

1. Fausta Brual remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her nephew, Ireneo Brual, and his wife Elizabeth Brual.

2. Elizabeth, as instituted heir and co-executor, filed before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late Fausta.

3. However, respondents, as nephews and nieces of Fausta, filed a manifestation and motion for intervention and supplemental allegations (in support of the manifestation and motion to intervene) before the probate court.

4. The RTC issued an Order/Resolution denying the respondents' motion for intervention and supplemental allegation.

5. The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and without compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by. Hence, the RTC did not find any compelling reason to grant the motion for intervention

6. Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.

7. Hence, the respondents filed their notice of appeal.

8. The RTC issued an Order dismissing respondents' appeal due to their failure to file a record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

9. Undaunted, respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration and admit records on appeal. It was their belief that the submission of a record on appeal would only come after the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket fees.

10. The RTC ultimately denied respondents' omnibus motion

11. Undeterred by the ruling of the RTC, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their appeal

12. The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of respondents' appeal. It held that an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere procedural technicalities.

13. Elizabeth filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing respondents’ appeal due to failure to file a record on appeal.

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Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

Under Section 2 of Rule 41, it states that: x x x No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require.

On the other hand, under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party.

The rules are clear. While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed simultaneously, the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record of appeal shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the final order dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date respondents' counsel received the order of denial. Respondents had until December 15, 2010 within which to file their notice and record on appeal. Since they filed their motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2010, the period for filing of the appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final order denying their motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2011, the period to appeal, applying the fresh period rule, resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules. Verily, respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without a record on appeal. Thus, on April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its non-perfection and failure to file the required record on appeal. It was only on June 27, 2011 that respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal while claiming inadve1ience and lack of knowledge on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.

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Esperanza P. Gaoiran vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norter, Sps. Timoteo S. Pablo and Perlita Pablo et.al., G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022

Esperanza P. Gaoiran vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norter, Sps. Timoteo S. Pablo and Perlita Pablo et.al.,

G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022

Facts:

1. Petitioner alleged that her friends introduced to her a certain Timoteo H. Pablo, Jr. who was allegedly looking for a buyer of a land registered under the name of his wife, Perlita S. Pablo.

2. Timoteo was able to convince petitioner to purchase the said property upon the representation that he was authorized by his wife, Perlita to sell the same. On the same day, petitioner delivered the purchase price to Timoteo and in exchange, Timoteo surrendered the first owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to petitioner and undertook to deliver a deed of absolute sale signed by his wife. Timoteo, however, did not make good his promise

3. This prompted petitioner to institute before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City a complaint for Estafa against Timoteo.

4. Meanwhile, on the claim that the owner's duplicate copy of the subject property's title was missing, respondent Mary Nyre Dawn Alcantara, representing herself as the niece of respondent Perlita, and the latter's trustee, filed before the RTC of Laoag City a petition praying that the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT T-34540 that had been lost be declared as null and void. She likewise prayed for the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540.

5. Finding sufficient, competent and credible evidence in support of the petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the RTC of Laoag City ordered the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540. Pursuant to which, the RTC of Laoag City declared the lost owner's duplicate copy as null and void.

6. Then petitioner instituted before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the Decision of the RTC of Laoag City.

7. Petitioner averred that it was only upon her inquiry with the RD-Laoag about the status of the aforesaid title, that she discovered that a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 was issued in favor of Perlita.

8. In view of the foregoing incidents, petitioner filed the aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

9. CA: CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment declaring that a petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court cannot be used to impugn the second owner's duplicate certificate of title which was issued in the reconstitution proceeding before the trial court for to do so would constitute a collateral attack upon the issued certificate of title which is sanctioned by Section 48 of PD 1529.

10. Hence, this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

Issues:

· Whether or not petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court is proper

· Whether or not the Petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy

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Ruling:

FIRST ISSUE

The Supreme Court held that petitioner availed of the wrong mode of appeal when she filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the Resolutions of the CA. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In Alba v. Court of Appeals and Linzag v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a party aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals in a petition filed with it for annulment of judgment, final order or resolution is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but rather an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 where only questions of law may be raised. A petition for certiorari is, like a petition for annulment, a remedy of last resort and must be availed of only when an appeal or any other adequate, plain or speedy remedy may no longer be pursued in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is said to be plain, speedy and adequate when it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.

In this case, the CA acted within its jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed Decision. The decision was a final judgment that disposed of the case in a manner leaving the court with nothing more to do. Accordingly, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in the Supreme Court.

SECOND ISSUE

Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that the CA erred in failing to annul the Decision of the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.

For an order of reconstitution to be issued, it must be clearly shown that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction

The Court reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

That there was no valid contract of sale executed between Perlita and petitioner is of no moment. The indelible fact remains that the allegedly lost genuine certificate of title was all the while in the custody of petitioner. Ergo, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the reconstitution proceeding.

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